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1 Introduction
Empirical studies suggest systematic relationships between plants productivity and plants emis-
sions and emission-abatement costs. This paper demonstrates that productivity dispersion across
plants is an important factor that inuences the transmission of environmental policy. Within a
general equilibrium framework, I model heterogeneous polluting plants by allowing them to be
di¤ering in productivity and to choose optimally a discrete emission-reduction technology taking
into account both the costs of reducing emissions and the competition in the goods market. An
emission-reduction policy a¤ects the distribution of plants with the advanced abatement technol-
ogy and relocates resources and market shares across plants. As a result, the aggregate e¤ects
of an environmental policy depend on the degree of productivity dispersion. Using Canadian
data, I show quantitatively that the aggregate e¤ects of an environmental policy signicantly af-
fected by the degree of productivity dispersion both in the transition periods and in the long-run
steady-state equilibrium.
Modelling the heterogeneity of polluting plants is motivated by the fact that plantspolluting
and emission-reducing activities vary substantially across plants and exhibit systematic relation-
ship with their levels of productivity. The Environmental Accounts and Statistics Division of
Statistics Canada (2004, 2005) reported that there exists a large variation of abatement expen-
ditures and choices of abatement technologies across plants both within an industry and across
industries. There are also some empirical works that nd some relationships between plants
productivity and their emission generation and reduction. For example, Shadbegian and Gray
(2003) have found a negative relationship between emissions (weighted by output) and productiv-
ity levels; Gray and Shadbegian (1995) have found that a higher abatement spending is associated
with a lower productivity level.
The existence of pronounced heterogeneity in polluting and emissions-reducing activities may
cause the emission-reducing policies to generate substantial distributional e¤ects. For example,
an ad valorem emission tax leads to resource reallocation owed from low productivity plants to
1
high productivity plans. The positive e¤ect of this relocation is that it increases the aggregate
productivity. However, the emissions tax can also cause some low productivity plants to expe-
rience losses and to exit from the industry. This process may involve in wasting sunk costs in
plants that exit and reducing varieties of goods that consumers could choose. The overall e¤ects
depend on which one is dominant.
Calibrated to match Canadian data, this paper shows that the aggregate cost of reducing
20%-25% of GHG emissions from the current level in Canadian industries, which is close to the
target set in the Kyoto Protocol  6% below the 1990 level, is about 2 times as large as that
in a similar economy assumed without productivity dispersion. The higher costs are mainly
due to the interaction between the productivity dispersion and the non-convex choice of new
abatement technologies. In the economy with homogeneous plants, all the plants utilize more
e¢ cient abatement technologies, while in the economy with productivity dispersion, only 28% of
plants adopt the new abatement technology. Hence, productivity dispersion divides plants into
two groups with sharp di¤erence in their e¢ ciency of emission-reduction. The low productivity
plants group has higher average abatement costs. This ine¢ cient group is the source of the higher
aggregate abatement costs.
The paper also studies the dynamics of an economy under emissions taxes. Taking advantage
of the Ghironi and Melitz (2005) model, the current model with heterogeneous polluting plants is
tractable not only in the steady state, but also in a dynamic setting. Considering the transition
of the economy, it is still more costly to reduce emissions in the economy with productivity
dispersion.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and characterizes the
equilibrium; Section 3 calibrates the model; Section 4 conducts numerical experiments; Section 5
concludes.
2
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical households. The representative house-
hold is innitely lived and has preferences over streams of consumption goods and pollutant stocks
(pollution) at each date. The expected discounted life time utility is
max
fmt;qtg
E0
1X
t=0
t[(1  )g(DtD )m

t + qt
]
1
 : (2.1)
Here, mt is the consumption of clean goods, qt is the consumption of an aggregate of dirty goods,
and Dt is the level of the pollutant stock. The subjective discount factor is  2 (0; 1): Restrict
 1 <  < 0, so that the clean goods and the dirty aggregate are poor substitutes. Let D be a
threshold level of the pollutant stock, above which the pollution causes disutility. So g(DtD ) = 1
for all Dt  D: If the pollutant stock is higher then the threshold value, g(DtD ) = (DtD )	, where
	 > 0: The particular specication of g implies that the utility delivered by the clean goods is
reduced as the pollution level increases and therefore the share of clean goods increases in the
pollutant stock. 1.
Every household is endowed with l unit of resource per period. This resource is the only input
required for production. The production of dirty goods generates emissions. The total amount
of emissions generated in period t is denoted as Et. Emissions accumulate according to
Dt = (1  1)Dt 1 + Et; (2.2)
where 1 2 (0; 1) is a decay factor for the pollutant stock: Let D 1 be the initial level of the
pollutant stock.
Di¤erent dirty goods appear in the utility function through the following aggregator:
qt = [
Z
i2
t
qi;t
( 1)
 di]

( 1) (2.3)
1The paper has also calculated the results using an alternative utility function in which the utility from goods
and the disutility from pollution are separable. The results of this paper are not driven by the utility function
specied here.
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Here,  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across dirty goods, and 
t is the set of dirty goods
available at period t. Let 
 = [t
t be the entire set of dirty goods available over time, where 

is assumed to be a continuum. Let pi;t denote the price of dirty goods i 2 
t: The price of the
aggregate of the dirty goods at t is
Pt = [
Z
i2
t
pi;t
(1 )di]
1
(1 ) :
2.1 The Government
As specied, pollution is an externality that is unlikely to be internalized in a laissez-faire economy.
This creates room for a government or institution to regulate pollution. In the model, the
government is bestowed a role to monitor and control emissions on behalf of consumers. Two
instruments are available: one is an ad valorem tax on emissions, the other is a uniform standard
on emissions-output ratio. When the tax instrument is applied, the tax revenue is simply returned
to consumers as a lump-sum transfer. The governments budget constraint is
Tt =  tEt; (2.4)
where Tt is a lump-sum transfer to consumers, and  t is the tax rate.
2.2 The Producers Problem
There are two sectors in this economy. One is a clean sector in which competitive plants produce
goods without generating emissions. The other is a dirty sector which features monopolistic
competition. That is, each plant monopolizes the production of one kind of di¤erentiated goods
i 2 
: Potential plants can choose to enter the clean sector freely or enter the dirty sector with a
sunk entry cost fe;t in units of resource. The plants enter the dirty sector if the present value of
the expected prot stream can cover this entry cost.
2.2.1 The Clean Sector
The clean goods Mt are produced by a linear production technology:
Mt = XLm;t;
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where X represents the level of productivity and Lm;t is the quantity of the resources used to
produce goods Mt in period t: The competitive feature of this market ensures that the factor
price equals the level of productivity, wt = X: The supply of clean goods is determined by market
clearing conditions.
2.2.2 The Dirty Sector
In the dirty sector, plants are monopolistically competitive. Under the specication of the aggre-
gator in (2.3), each plant faces a constant elasticity : Hence, the optimal pricing strategy is to
set the price as a constant markup, =(   1); over the marginal cost.
Potential plants are identical before they enter the dirty sector. Upon entry, each plant
draws a productivity level x from a common distribution G(x) with support on [xmin;1): This
productivity level remains constant for the plant thereafter. Thus, I can refer to a plant with
productivity x as plant x.
In order to produce any, a plant needs to pay a xed cost f > 0 in units of resource. For
simplicity, I let all the plants share the same xed cost over all the periods. Hence, some plants
never produce if they draw a low level of productivity after entry. The production technology of
a plant that draws productivity x is
qst (x) = xLg;t(x); (2.5)
where Lg;t(x) is the variable input required for producing goods x.
Producing the dirty goods generates air emissions. The amount of emissions generated by
plant x is
et(x) = zt(x)
1 hbLg;t(x): (2.6)
Here, b > 0 and h  1 are constant. The variable zt(x) is the relative cleanness of producing
goods x, which depends positively on the amount of resources that the plant puts into abatement.
The above specication captures the intuitive idea that the amount of emissions increases with
the amount of inputs in production and decreases with the inputs into abatement. For simplicity
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and tractability, I will assume that
zt(x) = 1 +
La;t(x)
Lg;t(x)
;
where La;t(x) is the amount of resources that plant x puts into abatement. The total variable
cost in plant x is Lt(x) = Lg;t(x) + La;t(x):
When zt(x) = 1; the parameter b captures the intensity of emissions generated from produc-
tion. b is usually called the emission factor. New technologies can improve the emission factor b.
I assume that a xed investment is required to use the new abatement technology.
Note that the amounts of inputs into production and abatement are functions of the plants
productivity, x, as made explicit above. These inputs also depend on pollution regulation. Two
types of regulation are studied: an ad valorem tax on emissions and a standard on the emission-
output ratio. It will be shown that the level of productivity determines the amount of emissions
and hence the scale e¤ect of abatement technology. In turn, the abatement decision inuences
the costs and thus the price and sale.
An ad valorem Emission Tax The government monitors the polluting plants and imposes
an ad valorem tax  t on emissions. Given the resource price wt and the tax rate  t, the plant
x chooses abatement technology and variable abatement input, and sets price according to a
constant markup over variable cost. It is easy to show that this pricing strategy is optimal for
the plant. The quantity of output is determined by equilibrium demand.
The plant chooses whether to invest in a new abatement technology, which requires a xed
investment wtfa;t in every period and reduces b to bn: To decide whether to choose the new
technology, the plant compares the cost in each case. If the plant does not use the new abate-
ment technology, the total variable cost is the sum of the variable costs used in production and
abatement, plus the tax payment,
wt(La;t(x) + Lg;t(x)) +  tet(x):
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The total variable cost can be rewritten as a function of the cleanness index zt(x) :
zt(x)wtLg;t(x) +  tbzt(x)
1 hLg;t(x):
Given the production input Lg;t; the plant chooses the optimal cleanness index zt(x) to minimize
the above cost. That gives
zt = [
 t
wt
b(h  1)] 1h if  t
wt
b(h  1) > 1;
and
zt = 1 otherwise.
Note that this amount is identical for all plants who do not use the new technology.
If the plant chooses to use the new technology, the emission factor is reduced to bn(< b) and
there is an additional xed cost wtfa;t. The optimal choice of the cleanness index zt(x) in this
case is
zn;t = [
 t
wt
bn(h  1)] 1h if  t
wt
bn(h  1) > 1;
and
zn;t = 1 otherwise.
Note that, in both cases, if the tax rate is low such that  twt (h   1)  1b ( or 1bn ); the plants nd
not worthwhile to incur variable abatement costs to reduce emissions.
A plant adopts the new abatement technology in period t if and only if the prot is higher after
adopting it. Note that I have simplied the model by allowing for periodical choices of the new
abatement technology. If the investment is not periodical, then the plant needs to compare the
present value of the expected prot stream with the present value of the investment expenditures.
However, in the steady state equilibrium, these two methods give identical results.
To compute the prot, I need the information about prices of the goods. The prot maximizing
plants will set the prices according to a xed markup over variable costs. That is
p1t(x) = %nx
 1
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and
p2t(x) = %x
 1:
%n and % are dened as follows:
%n =

   1
wth
h  1znt if znt > 1
%n =

   1(wt +  tbn) otherwise
and
% =

   1
wth
h  1zt if zt > 1
% =

   1(wt +  tb) otherwise
Using these formulas of prices, I can compute the levels of prot with and without the new
abatement technology. Comparing the two, I nd that a plant adopts the new abatement tech-
nology if and only if the plants productivity is above a threshold level. This threshold is given
as
xa;t = f wtfa;t
P t Qt[ %
(1 )
n   %(1 )]
g 1 1 ;
where Qt = f
R
[qst (x)]
( 1)
 dxg ( 1) , and the dirty aggregate supplied, YQ; equals NQt:
If x  xa;t; the plant adopts the new abatement technology. I call such plants type I plants.
The emission level of such a plant is
e1t(x) = z
1 h
n;t bn%
 
n x
 1P t Qt:
The prot of such a plant is
1t(x) =
P t Qt

[
%n
x
]1    wtfa;t   wtf :
If x < xa;t; the plant does not use the new abatement technology. I call such plants type II
plants. The emission level of such a plant is
e2t(x) = z
1 h
t b%
 x 1P t Qt:
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The prot of such a plant is
2t(x) =
P t Qt

[
%
x
]1    wtf :
A notable feature is that the elasticity of substitution among dirty goods, ; inuences the
dispersion of emissions across plants. The higher is ; the easier the goods can be substituted by
others, and the larger is the dispersion of emissions.
Entry and Exit In every period, a plant can choose to produce the clean goods or to enter
the dirty sector. If a plant chooses to enter the dirty sector at time t, a sunk entry cost wtfe;t
is incurred but the plant can start producing only at time t + 1; which introduces a one-period
time-to-build lag in the model. After entry, the plant draws a productivity level. As shown
above, the plantsprot is an increasing function of the productivity level. Because every plant
needs a positive xed cost in order to produce, some low productivity plants do not produce and
exit immediately after entry. The producing plants keep their productivity levels forever until an
exogenous exit-inducing shock hitting on them with probability . This exit-inducing shock is
independent of the plantsproductivity levels, so G(x); truncated at a threshold level, xe;t, above
which plants produce, also represents the productivity distribution of all producing plants.2
Plant Averages According to the above analysis, the mass of producing plants that use the
new abatement technology in period t is N1;t = [1 G(xa;t)]Nt; and the mass of producing plants
that do not adopt the new abatement technology in period t is N2;t = [G(xa;t) G(xe;t)]Nt.
Following Melitz (2003), I assume that productivity x obeys Pareto distribution with a lower
bound xmin and shape parameter k >    1: That is G(x) = 1   (xmin=x)k; where k governs
the dispersion of productivity. As k increases, productivity dispersion decreases, and the levels
of plantsproductivity become increasingly concentrated toward their lower bound xmin: To see
2 In order to simplify the analysis, I will look at only stationary equilibria, in which the tax rate or the standard
is identical in every period. A change in pollution regulation can be seen as a permanent shock, which can move
one stationary equilibrium to another.
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this, note that the mean of x is kk 1xmin and the variance of x is
k
k 2x
2
min. Fixing the mean; say
at x; the variance is (k 1)
2
k(k 2) x; which decreases in k for all k > 2.
Dene two special "average" productivity levels, an average ~x1;t for all producing type I plants,
and an average ~x2;t for all producing type II plants:
~x1;t =
"
1
1 G(xa;t)
Z 1
xa;t
x 1dG(x)
# 1
 1
= xa;t;
and
~x2;t =
"
1
G(xa;t) G(xe;t)
Z xa;t
xe;t
x 1dG(x)
# 1
 1
= xe;t
"
1  #k+1 
1  #k
# 1
 1
;
where  = ( kk+1  )
1
 1 and # = xe;txa;t : Note that the integration requires k + 1   > 0 for  > 1:
It is easy to show that ~x1;t and ~x2;t completely summarize the information in the distribution
of productivity levels G(x) relevant to all aggregate variables. Thus, this economy is isomorphic,
in terms of all aggregate outcomes, to one where N1;t plants with productivity ~x1;t are type I and
N2;t plants with productivity ~x2;t are type II. Accordingly, ~p1;t  p1;t(~x1;t) represents the average
price of type I plants, and ~p2;t  p2;t(~x2;t) represents the average price of type II plants. The
price of the dirty aggregate is written as
Pt = [n1;t(~p1;t)
1  + n2;t(~p2;t)
1 ]1=(1 ):
Similarly, denote ~1;t  1;t(~x1;t) as the average prot of type I plants, and ~2;t  2;t(~x2;t) as the
average prot of type II plants. The average prot of all dirty plants is ~t = n1;t~1;t +n2;t~2;t . It
is easy to show that
~1;t =
P t Qt

[
%n
~x1;t
]1    wtfa;t   wtf ;
and
~2;t =
P t Qt

[
%
~x2;t
]1    wtf:
The prospective entrants are forward looking, and correctly anticipate their future average
prots ~t in every period. The discounted present value of an entrant is given by
~ve;t = [1 G(xe;t)]Et
 1X
s=t+1
Rs~s
!
:
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Plants discount future prots using the households subjective discounting factor, Rs (to be
dened in next subsection): Entry occurs until the average plant value is equalized with the entry
cost, leading to the free entry condition ~ve;t = wtfe;t: This condition holds so long as the mass
Ne;t of entrants is positive.
After drawing a productivity level x; a plant exits if its present value of prot stream vx;t is
negative.
vx;t = Et
 1X
s=t+1
Rsx;s
!
;
where x;s is the anticipated prot of plant x in period s: Let xe be the productivity level such
that vxe;t = 0: Hence, plants exit after entry if x < xe: The average value of the incumbent plants
is
~vt = Et
 1X
s=t+1
Rs~s
!
:
An Emission Standard The government monitors the plants and sets a standard, st, on the
emission-output ratio. That is, all plants are required to satisfy et(x)qt(x)  st: Given the resource
price wt and the standard st; the plants choose whether to adopt the new abatement technology,
make variable abatement choice, zt; and set prices according to the constant markup. I consider
only the case st < bn here, because the other case st  bn is trivial.
The e¤ects of the standard st on a plants choices depend on the plants productivity level.
Recall that et(x) = zt(x)1 hb
qt(x)
x if the plant does not invest in the abatement technology, and
et(x) = zt(x)
1 hbn
qt(x)
x if it does. So the standard requires that
zt1 hb
x  st if not investing, and
zn;t1 hb
x  st if investing. Note that, if zt(x) = 1; i.e. there are no variable abatement costs,
the emission-output ratio is negatively related to the productivity level. Thus, I can classify the
plants into ve groups3 according to their choices of abatement methods with a nice future that
they are sorted by their productivity levels.
(1) Type 1 plants, x  bst : These plants do not abate emissions. They have high productivity,
3For illustrating simplicity, I assume that the proportion of exiting plants is very small here, such that only
some of the type 5 plants exit.
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high output-input ratio, and low emissions-output ratio. They satisfy the standard without any
abatement. Let x1;t = bst be the threshold value; the average productivity level for type 1 plants
is
~x1:t = x1;t;
recall  = ( kk+1  )
1
 1 :
(2) Type 2 plants, bst > x  x2;t: These plants incur only variable abatement costs. They
have slightly higher emissions-output ratio than the type 1 plants. They need to reduce only
a minor amount of emissions to satisfy the standard. So they do not invest in the abatement
technology but only use some variable input to reduce emissions. The threshold value of type 2
plants, x2;t; is obtained when
P t Qt

(

   1zt(x)
wt
x
)1    P

t Qt

(

   1
wt
x
)1    wtfa;t = 0; (2.7)
where zt(x) = ( bstx)
1
h 1 : The left hand side of equation (2.7) is the di¤erence between the prot
if the plant uses only variable abatement input and the prot if the plant invests in the new
technology but not uses variable inputs.
The average productivity of type 2 plants is
~x2;t = [
1
G(x1) G(x2)
Z x1
x2
x
h( 1)
h 1 dG(x)]
h 1
h( 1)
= $x2;t[
1  (x2;tx1;t )
k h( 1)
h 1
1  (x2;tx1;t )k
]
h 1
h( 1) ;
where $ = [ k
k h( 1)
h 1
]
h 1
h( 1) : And the average price of type 2 plants is
~p2;t =  ~x
  h
h 1
2;t ;
where  =  1(
b
st
)
1
h 1wt: Note that when the variable abatement cost is positive, the average
productivity is inuenced by h:
(3) Type 3 plants, x2;t > x  x3;t: These plants invest in the new abatement technology
only. These plants have even higher emission-output ratio, so they have a big scale of emission-
generation such that is cheaper to reduce emissions by investing the new abatement technology.
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The new abatement technology can bring the emission-output ratio below the standard, so no
variable abatement costs are incurred. The threshold value x3;t is obtained when
x3;t =
bn
st
:
The average level of productivity is
~x3;t = x3;t[
1  (x3;tx2;t )k+1 
1  (x3;tx2;t )k
]
1
 1 :
(4) Type 4 plants, x3;t > x  x4;t: These plants adopt the new technology and use variable
input to reduce emissions. The threshold value x4;t is obtained when
P t Qt

(

   1zn;t(x)
wt
x
)1    wtfa;t   P

t Qt

(

   1zt(x)
wt
x
)1  = 0; (2.8)
where zn;t(x) = ( bnstx)
1
h 1 : The left hand side of (2.8) is the di¤erence between the prot when the
plant invests in the new technology and also uses some variable input and the prot when the
plant uses variable inputs to reduce emissions only. The threshold value is
xa;t = x4;t = f wtfa;t
P t Qt[
(1 )
n   (1 )]
g h 1h( 1) ;
where n =

 1(
bn
st
)
1
h 1wt: The average productivity level is
~x4;t = $xa;t[
1  (xa;tx3;t )
k h( 1)
h 1
1  (xa;tx3;t )k
]
h 1
h( 1) :
(5) Type 5 plants, xa;t > x  xe;t: These plants incur only the variable abatement costs. They
have the highest emissions-output ratio. The total amount of emissions and output are both small.
The emission-generation scale is small such that investing in a new abatement technology is too
expensive. They abate using variable input only to maintain a low level of producing activity.
~x5;t = $xe;t[
1  #k h( 1)h 1
1  #k ]
h 1
h( 1)
For reasonable parameters all these 5 types of producers exist. For some extreme values
of policy and technology parameters, some types may not exist. For example, for a stringent
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pollution policy it is possible that all the type 5 plants go out of business and even some type 4
or type 3 plants exit.
The prots of plants using di¤erent technologies are depicted in Figure 2.1: Line 1 depicts
the prot of plants if plants do not reduce emissions. Line 2 is the prot of plants with only
variable abatement costs. Line 3 is the prot of plants with only xed investment in abatement
technology. Line 4 is the prot of plants with both xed and variable abatement costs. Given a
level of productivity, a plant will choose the method of abatement that gives highest prot.
0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Productivity level x
P
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 Y Q
 )
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with variable input line 2
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type 4
type 3
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type 5
Figure 2.1 The choice of abatement methods w,r.t x
Knowing the threshold values that determine the types of plants, I can now calculate the mass
of each type of plants. Denote the mass of type j plants as Nj;t; the proportion of type j plants
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is denoted as nj;t, and the mass of producing plants is Nt: Thus,
n1;t =
N1;t
Nt
= (
xmin
x1;t
)k;
nj;t =
Nj;t
Nt
= [(
xmin
xj;t
)k   ( xmin
xj 1;t
)k];
for j = 2; 3; 4; and
n5;t =
N5;t
Nt
= [1  (xe;t
xa;t
)k]:
Denote Na;t as the number of plants who invest in the new abatement technology. Then
Na;t = N3;t +N4;t:
The average price (~pj;t) and quantity (~q
s
j;t
) of type j plants can be calculated according to the
average productivity. The aggregate price of the dirty goods is dened as
Pt = [
5X
j=1
nj;t(~pj;t)
1 ]1=(1 ):
The average prot is dened as
~t =
5X
j=1
nj;t~j;t ;
where ~j;t is the average prot of type j plants. The average emissions of type j plants is
~ej;t = e (~xj;t);
and the aggregate emissions level is
Et =
5X
j=1
Nj;t~ej;t:
2.3 The Households Problem
The representative household enters period t with an endowment of the resource l and mutual
fund share holdings At; which nance the continuing operation of all pre-existing plants and all
new entrants during period t in the dirty sector. The mutual fund pays a total prot in each
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period that is equal to the total prot of all dirty plants that produce in that period. The period
budget constraint of the representative household (in units of the clean goods) is
Ptqt +mt + (~vtNt + ~ve;tNe;t)At+1 = wtl + (~vt + ~t)NtAt + Tt; (2.9)
where wt is the resource price denominated in clean goods. During period t; a mass Nt of plants
is in operation and pays dividend. The mass of plants evolves according to
Nt+1 = (1  )Nt + (1  )(1 G(xe;t))Ne;t;
since the plants with their productivity levels lower than xe;t exit immediately after entry and a
proportion  of the remaining plants will be hit by the exogenous exit shock at the very end of
period t. Tt is the lump sum transfer from the government.
Given the budget constraint (2.9), the household maximizes expected intertemporal utility
(2.1). The relative marginal utility of the clean goods and the dirty goods depends on the
aggregate level of pollution, that is
Um
UQ
=
1  

(
mt
qt
) 1(
Dt
~D
)	 =
1
Pt
: (2.10)
As pollution level increases, the marginal utility of the clean goods increases relative to the
marginal utility of the dirty aggregate. The demand for the dirty goods i is
qi;t = qt[
pi;t
Pt
] : (2.11)
The Euler equation for the share is
~vt = Et[Rt+1(~vt+1 + ~t+1)];
where Rs = [(1 )]s t( st )
1

 1 g(Ds)
g(Dt)
(msmt )
 1Nt+1
Nt
is the stochastic subjective discounting factor,
for s > t; and t = (1  )g(Dt)mt + qt.
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2.4 A Steady State Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are as follows:
(1) the goods markets clear:
Mt = mt (2.12)
NQt = qt (1.13)
(2) the resource market clears:
Lm;t +Nn;tfe;t +Ntf +Na;tfa;t +N
Z
Lt(x)dG(x) = l (2.14)
and (3) the share market clears:
At = 1 (2.15)
Now, it proceeds to dene the steady state equilibrium. For all t; and for x 2 [xmin;1);
Denition 1 An allocation is comprised of quantities of (mt; qi;t; At) for consumers, (Lm;t; Mt)
for producers in the clean sector, and (Lg;t(x); La;t(x); qst (x); et(x); Fa;t) for producers in the
dirty sector, where Fa;t = fa;t if the plants invest in the new abatement technology and Fa;t = 0
otherwise;
Denition 2 A price system is comprised of (wt; Pt; pt(x));
Denition 3 A government policy is comprised of st for the standard or ( t; Tt) for the tax;
Denition 4 A steady state equilibrium is a time-invariant allocation, a time-invariant price
system, a law of motion of the aggregate level of pollution with pollution level constant over time,
i.e. 1Dt 1 = Et, and a time-invariant government policy such that (a) given the government
policy, the law of motion of the aggregate level of pollution, and the price of resource wt and the
relative price Pt; the prices pt(x) and the quantities (Lg;t(x); La;t(x); qst (x); et(x); Fa;t) solve
the plant s problem in the dirty sector; (b) given the price system, the government policy, and
the law of motion of the aggregate level of pollution, the allocation solves both the consumers
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problem and the plants problem in the clean sector; (c) given the allocation, the price system,
and the law of motion of the aggregate level of pollution, the government policy satises the
budget constraint (2.3); (d) market clearing conditions from (2.12) to (2.15) are satised; (e) the
free entry condition holds; (f) the distributions for plants size, emissions, prot, and value are
stationary; and (g) consistency between the individual plantsbehavior and aggregate variables.
It is not di¢ cult to show that there is a unique steady state equilibrium given a pollution
policy.
3 Calibration
This model integrates emissions into a standard general equilibrium model with heterogenous
plants. So I calibrate the model with commonly used empirical evidence found in the literature
whenever it is possible. The parameters specic to the paper, most related to emissions, are
calibrated to Canadian output, emissions, and abatement expenditure data between 1990 and
2006.
During the period 2000-2006, some regulation on GHG emissions in the near future were an-
ticipated after Canada signed the Kyoto Protocol. Some agreements on reducing GHG emissions
between the government and some industries and polluting plants4 were signed. As a result, some
plants have adopted new systems or equipment to reduce GHG emissions although no explicit
regulation on reducing GHG was announced.
3.1 Parameters from Conventional Evidence
4Some industries and provinces have signed agreement with the governmnet. For example, April 2005, all major
companies of Canadas automobile industry have signed an agreement with the government to voluntarily reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions to help Canada meets its commitments under the Kyoto climate protocol. The pact
focuses on immediate action to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
June 2005, an agreement has been signed between the Government of Canada and the Air Transport Association
of Canada to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in Canadas aviation sector.
December 2006, Ontario announced an Act called Bill 179 for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in
Ontario.
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Table 3:1 lists the values of parameters that are taken to t the empirical evidence commonly
used in the literature. According to Dunne et. al. (1989), the average failure rate of plants
in U.S. manufacturing during any ve years is 0:391. Hence, the annual failure rate implied by
their study is 0:08. This value is used as the exogenous exit rate : Again from Dunne et. al.
(1989), the annual new entrants rate NnN is approximately 0:095. A stationary distribution of
plants requires that
Nn
N
=

(1  )(1 G(xe)) : (3.1)
Solving equation (3.1) gives that G(xe) equals 0:08; where xe is the threshold value of produc-
tivity above which plants produce. The value of G(xe) will be used to identify the xed cost of
production later.
Table 3.1 The parameters identied according to conventional evidence
Parameter Value Comments
Time preference  0:96 real interest rate 4% per year
Exit shock  0:08 Dunne et. al. (1989)
Entry rate Nn=N 0:095 Dunne et. al. (1989)
Emissions decay rate 1 0:008 Kolstad (1996)
Threshold of emissions stock D 32:0 1965 pollution stock
Initial level of emissions stock D 1 32:1 1990 pollution stock
The decay rate of GHG emissions is 0:083 per decade found in the literature (Kolstad (1996)
among others), which implies an annual decay rate 1 of 0:008 . The threshold value D is taken
as the 1965s stock level of GHG ( 1965 is usually taken as a reference point, Nordhaus (1993)
and Kolstad (1996)). I set ~D to equal 32 gigaton CO2 equivalent.5 Given D; D 1 is calculated
as 32:1 gigaton at the beginning of 1990.
3.2 Parameters Matching Canadian Data
The preference parameters depend on the denition of the dirty sector and the clean sector. The
denition of the dirty sector is provided in the appendix. The clean to dirty goods sales ratio YmYQ ,
5The literature (e.g. Nordhaus (1993), and Kolstad (1996)) used 667 gigaton as the stock of GHG for U.S.
in 1965. Since Canada emits roughly 0:1 percent of that in US and this paper cut o¤ the emissions other than
industrial emissions, which is about 52% percent of total GHG, 4.8% of 667 is used as ~D.
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the pollutant stock Dt; and the relative price Pt during 1990 and 2006 are used to calibrate ; ;
and 	. The relative price of dirty goods to clean goods is constructed (see appendix for detail).
In order to identify ; ; and 	; I rewrite equation (2.5) as
ln
Ym
YQ
=
1
1   ln(
1  

) +
	
1   ln(
Dt
~D
) +

1   lnPt: (3.2)
Given the data on Pt, Dt; and Ym;t=YQ;t; the preference parameters can be estimated by using
equation (3.2).
Equation (3.2) predicts that Ym;t=YQ;t decreases in the relative price Pt since the dirty goods
and the clean goods are complements,  1 <  < 0: The coe¢ cient  determines the magnitude
of this e¤ect. The higher is the absolute value of , the lower is the substitutability, and the
larger is the e¤ect of the price change on the ratio Ym;t=YQ;t. Equation (3.2) also predicts that
an increasing pollution level leads to consumers demanding more clean goods, which leads to a
higher ratio Ym;t=YQ;t: 	 inuences the impact of Dt on Ym;t=YQ;t: A higher 	 implies a higher
disutility from pollution for consumers and therefore a stronger e¤ect. 	 should be higher than
jj. If not, Dt would have a positive e¤ect on utility. Also, it is not reasonable to have a value of 	
much higher than jj since the GHG emissions have not caused a major disutility: The disutility
parameter is assumed to be less than jj  1:5: The average value of YQ;t=Y in the data is 0:38:
The value of the exogenous share of dirty goods  in the model should not be far away from the
dirty goods share YQ;t=Y in the data. Given these restrictions, I estimate parameters ;  and
	 by seeking the estimates that minimize the divergence between the model and the data, and
I nd  = 0:36;  =  0:4; and 	 = 0:45 give the best t. The model simulated ln Ym;tYQ;t and the
data are depicted in gure 3:1.
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Figure 3.1 Models t
In order to calibrate the abatement-related parameters h; bn and fa, I split the data into three
sub-periods: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2006. In the rst period, there was no emission-
reduction e¤ort. During the second sub-period, the Kyoto Protocol was signed and Canada
committed to reduce GHG emissions to a level 6% below the 1990 level between 2008 - 2012.
Accordingly, some plants started using new abatement technologies during 2002 and 2006. So
I calibrate the parameters characterizing the basic economy without emission-reduction in the
rst period and calibrate the abatement technology related parameters in the third period. Since
in the model plants will adopt new abatement technology only if there are some enforcement to
reduce emissions, I assume that there is an identical emission standard in the third period to
generate the emission-reduction activities reported by Environment Canada.
(1) In the rst period, there is no evidence in the data of any reduction of GHG emissions. So
this period is used to identify the parameter that describe the basic economic structure without
emission-reduction technology. The parameters to calibrated are the average productivity in the
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clean sector, X; the lowest productivity in the dirty sector, xmin; the productivity dispersion
parameter, k; the xed production cost, f; the xed entry cost, fe; the substitution parameter
among dirty goods, ; the emission factor, b, and the magnitude of the economy measured in
resources in the rst period, l1:
X is normalized to 1: The ex ante average productivity in the dirty sector is also normalized
to 1. That is
Z 1
xmin
xdG(x) = 1: xmin can be identied given the value of k and G(x) = 1  (xminx )k:
Other parameters are identied by simulating the model to match the moments in the rst period.
The dirty goods sales share is used to nd k: The exit and entry rates and equilibrium condition
mentioned above implied that G(xe) = 0:08; which in turn implies that f = 0:0475
YQ
wN (0:0066
in the numerical model); where YQ=N is the average avenue of the dirty plants: fe is calculated
from the free entry condition given the average prots of dirty plants 1YQ=N   wf; that is
fe =
(1 )
1 (1 )(1 G(xe))( 1
YQ
wN   f) = 1:5
YQ
wN ; where

 1 is the mark up. Using the relationship
b =  1
E
YQ
from integrating emissions across plants and the moment of the emission-sales ratio
E
YQ
= 2:15 in the data, I get  = 3:8 and b = 2:92 kilo-ton CO2 emissions equivalent per million
dollars. I set the endowment in this period l1 to be 0:35 trillion dollars in order to equate the
level of emissions generated in the model to the average level of emissions in the data during 1990
and 1994. The values of these parameters are listed in table 3.2.
Table 3.2 The parameters identied in period without emission-reduction
parameter value targets or constraints (1990-94)
clean sector productivity X 1 normalization
minimum productivity xmin 0:706
Z 1
xmin
xdG(x) = 1
emissions factor b 2:92 emissions sales ratio E=YQ, 2:15
substitution among dirty goods  3:8 b =  1
E
YQ
xed production costs f 0:0066 G(xe) = 1  (1 )Nn
N
= 0:08
xed entry costs fe 1:5YQ=N free entry condition
productivity dispersion k 3:4 dirty goods sales share, 0:39
resource l0 0:35 emissions level, 0:299 gigaton
(2) In the third period, the emissions-sales ratio in the dirty sector declines dramatically,
E
YQ
= 1:96: In the dirty sector, 24% of dirty plants reported using new system or equipment
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to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions. This is, by assumption, because of enforcing an emission
standard s: To achieve the emission-sales ratio in this period, s has to be 0:74b: The plants
that adopted new abatement technology also reported the impact of using the new abatement
technology. According to the reported impact of the technology in 2002, I set bn = 0:8b:6 The
xed cost of adopting the new abatement technology fa;t is approximately 1:3% of the dirty goods
sales according to the two facts that the capital expenditure on abatement in 2002 is 0:31% of the
dirty goods sales and there were 24% of plants who invested in the new abatement technology.
The percentage of plants that invested in new abatement technologies reported during the third
period is used to nd h. h is found to be 5:8; which implies that a one percent increase in
operating abatement expenditure reduce emissions by 4:8%. This means that for a plant with an
average productivity level it is more e¢ cient to use the new abatement technology than to use
the variable inputs to reduce emissions. The same expenditure could reduce emissions by 20% if
the plant uses the new abatement technology. Finally, I set the endowment l to be 0:492 trillion
dollars in order to equate the level of emissions generated in the model to the average level of
emissions in the data during 2000 and 2006. The values of these parameters are listed in table
3.3.
Table 3.3 The parameters identied in period with emission-reduction
parameter value targets or constraints (2000-2006)
abatement tech. h 5:8 investment rate, Na=N = 0:24
emission factor with new tech. bn 0:8b survey on abatement tech.
xed cost on new tech. fa 0:013YQ=N capital expenditure in abatement
standard s 0:74b emissions sales ratio E=YQ; 1:96
resource l 0:492 emissions level, 0:368 gigaton
6Among the plants reporting adoption of a new abatement technology, 13% reported signicant reduction of
GHG emissions, 44% reported mediam reduction, and 44% reported small reduction. I interpret signicant e¤ect
as 40%, medium e¤ect as 24%, and small e¤ect as 10%. This leads to an e¤ect of 20% on average. See appendix
table II
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4 Quantitative Experiment
4.1 Standard versus Tax
Emission standards and taxes generate di¤erent incentives for plants to reduce their emissions. As
shown in section 2, under an emission tax the plants with the highest productivity will adopt the
discrete abatement technology, while under the emission standard the plants with the middle levels
of productivity will adopt the abatement technology. This di¤erence in abatement choices induced
by di¤erent policies a¤ects the abatement e¢ ciency and production e¢ ciency and therefore the
relocation of resources across plants.
Emission standards and taxes also increase the relative price of dirty goods to di¤erent extends.
The emission tax is a price instrument. As plants incorporate emission taxes into their production
plan, the price of dirty goods increases directly. The emission standard is a quantity instrument.
It does not change price directly. Instead, it increases the amount of resources required to produce
one unit of dirty goods, including the resources used to reduce emissions in order to satisfy the
standards, and therefore it increases the price of their products to cover the additional variable
abatement costs. Recall that the price is set according to a xed mark-up over the variable
costs. The di¤erent degrees of price distortion caused by di¤erent policies a¤ect the reallocation
of resources between the clean and the dirty sector.
The following experiment compares the e¤ects of the emission tax and standard policies in
terms of aggregate outputs and relative prices for an equal amount of emission-reduction. Key
variables are listed in table 4.1. The unit for emissions E is gigaton. As shown in table 4.1, the
price of dirty goods is higher under the emission tax. As a result, a higher quantity of clean goods
but a less quantity of dirty goods are produced (demanded) under the tax policy compared to
under the standard. The quantities of resources allocated to the dirty sector are higher under the
standard policy. The average productivity in the dirty sector is also higher under the standard
due to that a higher proportion of low productivity plants exits from the industry. These e¤ects
are more pronounced if a larger proportion of emissions is reduced as shown in table 4.2.
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Table 4.1 Compare the models under the tax and under the standard
tax  = $3:33=per ton standard s = 0:74b
m 0:3185 0:3183
q 0:1857 0:1863
E 0:3680 0:3680
p 1:0169 1:0110
N 1:2977 0:9495
Na=N 0:82% 24:41%
G(xe) 8:55% 12:08%
resources in dirty sector Lx 0:1379 0:1388
average productivity 0:7427 0:7450
value of utility function 0:2018 0:2020
Table 4.2 Compare the models under the tax and under the standard
(under more stringent policies)
tax  = $8:00=per ton standard s = 0:64b
m 0:3184 0:3175
q 0:1853 0:1867
E 0:3601 0:3601
p 1:0288 1:0143
N 1:2861 0:9495
Na=N 3:48% 25:95%
G(xe) 8:61% 13:01%
resources in dirty sector Lx 0:1376 0:1396
average productivity 0:7425 0:7474
value of utility function 0:2047 0:2049
The value of the utility function is slightly higher under the standard policy. This result
is di¤erent from the literature without the consideration of productivity dispersion, in which
emission tax is more e¢ cient. The main reason that the standard policy could be more e¢ cient
is that the average productivity of the dirty sector could be higher under the emission standard
compared to that under the emission tax. Under the emission standard, the very high productivity
plants do not incur additional abatement costs since they are born clean. As other plants incur
additional costs and increase their prices, these very high productivity plants gain additional
market shares. The very low productivity plants have to exit from the industry since they
are most ine¢ cient in reducing emissions. As a result, the dirty goods are produced by more
productive plants under the emission standard.
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4.2 Comparison of Results with and without Productivity Dispersion
This subsection studies the economic and environmental performance of an emission tax in an
economy without productivity dispersion relative to economies with di¤erent degrees of produc-
tivity dispersion. In order to have a fair comparison, a model without productivity dispersion
is constructed in a way such that the outputs of both the clean goods and the dirty goods are
as same as in the model with productivity dispersion specied above, in which the productivity
dispersion parameter k takes a value of 3:4. In the two models, all the parameters are the same
with the exception of the productivity parameters, which are listed in table 4:3. Using the same
method, I also construct two models with di¤erent degrees of productivity dispersion: k = 4
and k = 3:2. Table 4.3 shows that the economy with higher degree of productivity dispersion
(k = 3:2) generates less emissions in order to produce the same amount of outputs.
Table 4.3 The initial values of variables in models with and without productivity dispersion
dispersion parameters
k =1 (no dispersion) k = 4 k = 3:4 (benchmark) k = 3:2
m 0:3185 0:3185 0:3185 0:3185
q 0:1857 0:1857 0:1857 0:1857
E (gigaton) 0:3952 0:3721 0:3680 0:3618
($=ton) 3:33 3:33 3:33 3:33
X 0:9856 0:997 1 1:002
the mean of x 1:3720 1:184 1 0:882
4.2.1 Counterfactuals
The Estimates of Emissions under Taxes In the models with di¤erent degrees of produc-
tivity dispersion, imposing an emission tax reduces di¤erent amounts of emissions. Figure 4:1
depicts the proportion of emissions estimated by the models with di¤erent degrees of productivity
dispersion after imposing ad valorem emission taxes. As seen from the gure, starting from the
initial level of emissions (normalized to 1) and increasing the emission tax, the proportion of
emissions reduced in the economy without dispersion is larger than that in the economy with
dispersion up until a threshold value of the tax rate, after which the opposite is the case. In the
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simulated economies, the threshold value of the tax rate is around 33$ per ton of emissions. When
the tax rate is lower, the model without dispersion underestimates the reduction of emissions:
When the tax rate is above the threshold value, the model without dispersion overestimates the
reduction of emissions.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
tax rate $/ton
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 e
m
is
si
on
s
k=3.2
k=3.4
k=4
no dispersion
Figure 4.1 Tax rates and emissions reduction
The reason of this di¤erence in the estimates of emissions is as follows. Each plant chooses
whether to adopt the new abatement technology contingent on its productivity. In the economy
without dispersion; all the plants have an identical level of productivity. When the tax rate is
low, no plants adopt the new abatement technology. As the emissions tax increases, the prices
of dirty goods increase and less quantities are demanded. The emissions decline slightly and
it comes from the reduction of dirty-goods production. When the tax rate is high enough, all
the plants invest in the abatement technology. This conversion of abatement methods generates
a sharp drop of emissions when the threshold value of tax rate is reached in gure 4.1. In
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the economy with productivity dispersion, the very high productivity plants invest in the new
abatement technology when the tax rate is low. As the tax rate increases, plants with lower levels
of productivity gradually invest in the abatement technology. Hence, the reduction of emissions
is smooth.
Figure 4.1 also compares the reduction of emissions in economies with di¤erent degrees of
productivity dispersion. Starting from the initial levels of emissions, the economy with a higher
degree of productivity dispersion reduces a slightly larger proportion of emissions under a mod-
erate tax rate. As the tax rate increases, the economy with a higher degree of productivity
dispersion reduces less emissions. The reason is simply shown in table 4.4. The higher degree of
productivity dispersion, the smaller investing rate of the abatement technology under the same
tax rate.
Table 4.4 The reduction of emissions in models with di¤erent degrees of productivity dispersion
 = 88:05 ($/ton)
k = 3:2 k = 3:4 k = 4 no dispersion
emission reduction  15:34%  17:08%  20:00%  24:50%
variable abatement costs 0:00079 0:00088 0:00079 0:00003
investing rate Na=N 20:45% 28:30% 48:14% 100%
The E¤ects of Targeting Emissions The welfare consequences of pollution policies in an
economy with heterogeneous plants and in the economy with homogeneous plants may be sig-
nicantly di¤erent. Table 4.5 provides the e¤ects of reducing emissions by 3%, 20%, and 25%
below the initial levels of emissions. Table 4.6 provides the estimated costs of both production
and abatement in each model.
To reduce 3% of emissions, the economy with productivity dispersion is more e¢ cient. In
the economy without productivity dispersion, no plants adopt the new abatement technology, so
the reduction of emissions comes completely from the reduction of dirty goods production. The
price of the dirty goods increases by a much higher proportion than that in the economy with
productivity dispersion. This distortion induced by the emission tax causes the economy without
productivity dispersion to lose more GDP or the consumption of goods.
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Table 4.5.a The e¤ects of targeting emissions
k = 3:4
reduction of emissions initial level  3%  20%  25%
tax rate ($/ton) 3:33 10:59 92:96 100:75
consumption 4%7    0:14%  1:95%  2:44%
welfare 100% 102:03% 114:32% 118:83%
M 0:3185 0:3184 0:3201 0:3174
Q 0:1857 0:1851 0:1748 0:1752
dirty sector real output / input 1: 3692 1: 3696 1: 3733 1: 3745
P $ 1:0169 1:0354 1:2320 1:2490
real GDP 8 0:5073 0:5066 0:4979 0:4956
aggregate GDP 4%    0:14%  1:85%  2:31%
G(xe) 0:0855 0:0864 0:0948 0:0954
investing rate Na=N 0:82% 3:26% 27:84% 28:12%
exit rate 8:07% 8:29% 9:32% 9:33%
To meet the Kyoto Protocol, Canada needs to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions by 6% below
the 1990 level or more than 25% from the current level. In an economy with heterogeneous plants,
there are two di¢ culties in curbing the GHG emissions: (1) a large percentage of low productivity
plants will not adopt the new abatement technology and (2) some low productivity plants will go
out of business if the tax is imposed, leading to more waste of sunk entry costs. When the tax
rate increases to 100 $ per ton, the percentage of plants that adopt the new abatement technology
is just 28%. The dirty sector reduces emissions using less e¢ cient methods. Reducing emissions
by 25% costs the economy with heterogeneous plants by additional 0:87% of GDP compared to
the economy with homogenous plants. In the economy with heterogeneous plants, as the tax rate
increases, the exit rate increases and the entry cost increases.
7 It is the welfare cost measured by the percentage of consumption that has to be raised to achive the same
welfare level as in the initial state, keeping the emissions level as 0:3680:
8The real GDP is calculated using the price in the initial states.
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Table 4.5.b The e¤ects of targeting emissions
no dispersion
reduction of emissions initial level  3%  20%  25%
tax rate ($/ton) 3:33 29:80 39:90 90:37
consumption 4%9    0:26%  0:90%  1:67%
welfare 100% 101:93% 115:65% 1 20:0 7%
M 0:3185 0:3227 0:3140 0:3177
Q 0:1857 0:1801 0:1857 0:1781
dirty sector real output / input 1: 3705 1: 3705 1: 3705 1: 3705
P $ 0:9907 1:0610 1:0671 1:1837
real GDP 10 0:5087 0:5074 0:5041 0:5003
aggregate GDP 4%    0:26%  0:90%  1:65%
G(xe) 0 0 0 0
investing rate Na=N 0% 0% 100% 100%
exit rate 8% 8% 8% 8%
Table 4.6.a and table 4.6.b show the decomposition of costs in the economy with and without
productivity dispersion respectively. In the model with productivity dispersion, the variable
abatement costs increase dramatically in order to reduce 20%   25% of emissions, while the
investment expenditure in abatement technology is limited by the proportion of high productivity
plants that choose to invest in the new abatement technology. In the model without productivity
dispersion, all the plants invest in the new abatement technology and reduce emissions more
e¢ ciently, so they save some variable abatement inputs.
9 It is the welfare cost measured by the percentage of consumption that has to be raised to achive the same
welfare level as in the initial state, keeping the emissions level as 0:3680:
10The real GDP is calculated using the price in the initial states.
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Table 4.6.a The decomposition of costs
k = 3:4
emissions reduction initial level  3%  20%  25%
Lm trillion $ 0:3185 0:3184 0:3201 0:3174
Lg trillion $ 0:1379 0:1374 0:1294 0:1297
Latrillion $ 0 0 0:0019 0:0038
investment in abatement 0:0000 0:0001 0:0008 0:0008
entry cost 0:0269 0:0274 0:0310 0:0316
xed cost 0:0087 0:0087 0:0087 0:0088
total expenditure 0:4920 0:4920 0:4919 0:4921
Table 4.6.b The decomposition of costs
no dispersion
emissions reduction initial level  3%  20%  25%
Lm trillion $ 0:3231 0:327 4 0:318 6 0:3223
Lg trillion $ 0:1354 0:1313 0:1354 0:1299
Latrillion $ 0 0 0 0:0006
investment in abatement 0 0 0:0026 0:0028
entry cost 0:0242 0:0253 0:0262 0:0279
xed cost 0:0093 0:0080 0:0092 0:0085
total expenditure 0:4920 0:4920 0:4920 0:4920
4.2.2 The Distributional E¤ects
In an economy with productivity dispersion, a uniform emission tax has two side e¤ects in opposite
directions. On the one hand, it leads to a resource reallocation owed from low productivity plants
(including exiting plants) to high productivity plants. This increases the overall productivity of
the producing plants. On the other hand, it also increases the aggregate sunk entry cost since
some low productivity plants exit from the industry and the turnover of plants increases. In the
model, the second e¤ects tend to dominate such that the quantity of dirty goods declines. For
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example, when the tax rate is 10:59$ per ton; tables 4.5:a and table 4.6.a show that the increased
entry costs account for most of the losses of dirty goods.
Reallocation of resources and market shares When the emission tax applies, the high
productivity plants invest in the new abatement technology and their shares of emissions decrease;
the low productivity plants do not invest in the abatement technology and their shares of emissions
increase. The shares of output for high and low productivity plants move in opposite directions.
The high productivity plants increase their market shares as a result of the tax. Hence, the overall
productivity in the dirty sector increases. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show this distributional e¤ect.
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Figure 4.2 The share of emissions under an emissions tax
32
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Productivity level x
q(x) share
invest in new abatement technology
no investment
no tax
Figure 4.3 The share of output under an emissions tax
The Exit of Plants A stringent pollution policy forces more plants to exit from the dirty
sector. It reduces the welfare in two ways. First, table 4.5.a shows that the proportion of
producing plants (1 G(xe)) decreases as the tax rate increases in the economy with productivity
dispersion. This means that the variety of goods decreases. Second, as the turnover of plants
increases the sunk entry costs climbs. As a result, less resources are available to produce.
The controversial "grand-fathering" policy has the potential to prevent some sunk entry costs
because it grants the existing plants looser standards on emissions and hence it does not drive
as many low productivity plants out of business. However, it is at the expense of aggregate
productivity. The overall e¤ect depends on which partial e¤ect dominates.
4.3 Models without Exit
To understand better the sources of the di¤erent welfare consequences of an emission tax in the
economies with and without productivity dispersion, I also study the models without exit.
33
4.3.1 Re-Calibrate Some Parameter Values
The model with productivity dispersion In order to exclude the exit, I have to assume
that there is no xed cost in production and there is no death of plants. The prot margin is
enlarged by these adjustments. The free entry condition still holds although there is no entry in
the equilibrium. As the prot margin increases, the entry cost implied by the free entry condition
also increases. The value of fe rises to 6:316YQ=N: Since the prot margin is increased, I let the
average productivity in the dirty sector to be lower in order to keep the dirty goods sales share
at 0:39 without adjust the value of productivity dispersion parameter k; but the value of xmin
becomes 0:6354:Other parameters are kept as in the model with exit calibrated above. Finally,
to keep the emissions at the level 0:3680 gigaton, the resources l is adjusted to 0:4447.
The model without productivity dispersion The model without productivity dispersion
is constructed by adjusting the parameters governing the average productivity levels in both the
clean and the dirty sector. The key variables generated by the new models are listed in table 4.7.
Table 4.7 The initial values of variables in models with and without productivity dispersion
dispersion parameters
k =1 (no dispersion) k = 3:4
m 0:3068 0:3068
q 0:1628 0:1628
E (gigaton) 0:3940 0:3680
($=ton) 3:3300 3:3300
X 0:9904 1:0
the mean of x 1:2066 0:9
4.3.2 Quantitative Experiments
After eliminating the exit, the reduction of consumption or GDP is less in general in order to
reduce the same proportion of emissions. It is mainly because of the saved entry costs. Besides
this signicant change, other arguments about the comparison between the economy with and
without productivity dispersion in the case with exit hold in general. When the target is to
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reduce 3% of emissions, it is more costly in the economy without productivity dispersion; when
the target is to reduce 20%-25% of emissions, it is less costly in the economy without productivity
dispersion. The key variables are listed in table 4.8.a and table 4.8.b.
Table 4.8.a The e¤ects of targeting emissions - k = 3:4
k = 3:4
reduction of emissions initial level  3%  20%  25%
tax rate ($/ton) 3:33 10:59 93:92 101:92
consumption 4%    0:04%  1:21%  1:54%
welfare 100% 102:09% 114:86% 119:48%
M 0:3068 0:3071 0:3111 0:3088
Q 0:1628 0:1623 0:1542 0:1547
dirty sector real output / input 1: 3692 1: 3692 1: 3693 1: 3702
P $ 1:1600 1:1821 1:4116 1:4317
real GDP 0:4956 0:4954 0:4900 0:4882
aggregate GDP 4%    0:04%  1:13%  1:49%
investing rate Na=N 0:83% 3:38% 30:10% 30:10%
Table 4.8.b The e¤ects of targeting emissions - no dispersion
no dispersion
reduction of emissions initial level  3%  20%  25%
tax rate ($/ton) 3:33 29:80 43:8 91:18
consumption 4%    0:34%  0:53%  1:15%
welfare 100% 101:81% 116:08% 1 20:37%
M 0:3068 0:3108 0:3042 0:3080
Q 0:1628 0:1579 0:1628 0:1570
dirty sector real output / input 1: 3705 1: 3705 1: 3705 1: 3705
P $ 1:1151 1:2118 1:2291 1:3541
real GDP 0:4944 0:4932 0:4921 0:4894
aggregate GDP 4%    0:26%  0:46%  1:01%
G(xe) 0 0 0 0
investing rate Na=N 0% 0% 100% 100%
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4.4 The Welfare in Transition
It is usually with more interest to know the transition of an economy after a tax shock, especially
if it takes a long time to evolve to the new steady state. For simplicity, this section uses the
models without exit.
I start with the study of the tax shocks that bring the economy to a steady state with the
maximum welfare. So I nd the optimal steady-state rst. The steady-state welfare-maximizing
tax rates in the models with and without productivity dispersion are calculated and the corre-
sponding steady state equilibria are reported in table 4.9.a and 4.9.b.
Table 4.9.a The optimal tax rate in the model - k = 3:4
initial level optimal level
tax rate ($/ton) 3:33 112:1
emissions (gigaton) 0:3680 0:2560
consumption 4%    2:00%
welfare 100% 125:00%
M 0:3068 0:3061
Q 0:1628 0:1552
dirty sector real output / input 1: 3692 1: 3720
P $ 1:1600 1:4554
real GDP 0:4956 0:4861
aggregate GDP 4%    1:92%
investing rate Na=N 0:83% 30:10%
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Table 4.9.b The optimal tax rate in the model - no dispersion
initial level optimal level
tax rate ($/ton) 3:33 112:1
emissions (gigaton) 0:3940 0:2560
consumption 4%    1:96%
welfare 100% 131:34%
M 0:3068 0:3061
Q 0:1628 0:1552
dirty sector real output / input 1: 3705 1: 3720
P $ 1:1151 1:4554
real GDP 0:4944 0:4853
aggregate GDP 4%    1:84%
investing rate Na=N 0% 100%
4.4.1 Transition to the Optimal Steady State
Starting from the current state of the economy, suppose the steady state welfare-maximizing tax
rate is imposed and let the economy evolve to the optimal steady state. As shown in gure 4.4,
it takes over 300 years for the economy to evolve to the welfare-maximizing steady state. The
steady state welfare-maximizing tax rate over-shots the dirty sector such tha the dirty sector
output falls below its future steady state level. As the emissions stock decreases over time, the
dirty sector recovers itself, but the clean sector declines over time. After imposing the steady
state optimal tax rates, the emissions fall by 33% below the current level right after the policy
shock, which is below the level in the future steady state.
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Figure 4.4 The transition of variables under optimal steady state tax rates
4.4.2 Welfare-Improving Dynamic Taxes and Consumption Losses
Imposing the steady state welfare-maximizing tax rates, it still takes over 300 years to achieve the
steady state. It is welfare improving to reduce emissions more aggressively in the early periods
given that the emission stock causes disutility before the steady state is reached. In other words,
the optimal tax rates should be higher in the earlier periods. So I assume that the government
rst imposes a constant tax rate that is higher than the steady state optimal rate and lets the
emission stock decline. Once the emissions stock is low enough to sustain the optimal steady
state, the government change the tax rate to the steady state optimal and keeps it forever. Such
a tax instrument has an optimal rate 160$ per ton of emissions in the early years, and 112:1$per
ton of emissions in the later periods in the model with k = 3:4; and an optimal rate 156$ per
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ton of emissions in the early years, and 109:9$per ton of emissions in the later periods in the
model with no productivity dispersion. It takes only about 60 years for the economy to reach
the optimal steady state. The lifetime utility increases by 0:45% in the model with k = 4 and by
0:47% in the model with no productivity dispersion. The transition dynamics are shown in gure
4.5 below.
0 200 400 600
0.3
0.305
0.31
The evolution of m
periods
0 200 400 600
0.15
0.16
0.17
The evolution of Q
periods
0 200 400 600
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
The evolution of E
periods
0 200 400 600
30
32
34
36
38
The evolution of D
periods
k=3.4
no dispersion
Figure 4.5 The transition of variables under optimal two stages tax rates
Although the lifetime utility increases, the representative consumer consumes less consump-
tion goods in the economy with productivity dispersion. The present value of the discounted real
GDP decreases by 1:61%. The real GDP is a sum of the amount of the clean goods and the
dirty goods multiplied by the relative price, i.e. GDP = m+ pQN: The relative price used here
is the price in the optimal steady state. As shown in the experiments above, the GDP loss is
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approximately equal to the consumption loss.
Surprisingly, the present value of the discounted real GDP in the model without productivity
dispersion does not change. From both the consumption perspective and the environmental per-
spective, it is better to reduce emissions aggressively in the early stage if there is no productivity
dispersion. But in the model with productivity dispersion, the consumption losses from reducing
emissions aggressively in the early stage is large. This is because the di¤erent allocations of re-
sources in the two economies: the economy with no productivity dispersion produces more dirty
goods and less clean goods than the economy with productivity dispersion; the earlier increase of
the dirty goods consumption accounts more in the economy with no productivity dispersion.
4.4.3 Implementing the Kyoto Protocol
If the government lets the tax rate be 3:33$ per ton of emissions as specied in the benchmark
economy, the lifetime utility of a representative consumer is lowered by 2:19%, but the present
value of the discounted GDP is increased by 4:49% , compared to the two-stages optimal tax
rates. The transition of the economy is depicted in gure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 The transition of variables without further action
According to the Kyoto Protocol Canada should reduce emissions by 25:6% of the current
level. So I nd a tax rate, 100:57$ per ton of emissions, that could achieve this target. The
transition of the economy is shown in gure 4.7. The lifetime utility of a representative consumer
is 0:77% lower compared to that under the two-stages optimal tax rates. However, the present
value of the discounted GDP is increased by 2:33%. Compared to the economy without further
actions, to implement the Kyoto Protocol costs 2:16% of the real GDP in the dynamic model.
41
0 200 400 600
0.309
0.31
0.311
0.312
0.313
The evolution of m
periods
0 200 400 600
0.15
0.152
0.154
0.156
The evolution of Q
periods
0 200 400 600
0.272
0.274
0.276
0.278
0.28
The evolution of E
periods
0 200 400 600
34
35
36
37
38
39
The evolution of D
periods
Figure 4.7 The transition of variables implementing Kyoto Protocol
5 Conclusion
The paper has developed a general equilibrium model with polluting heterogeneous plants. The
polluting plants are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, contingent on which they opti-
mally choose whether or not to adopt a new abatement technology for a given pollution policy.
The emission tax and emission standard induce di¤erent groups of plants measured by their pro-
ductivity levels to adopt the new abatement technology. Under the emission standard, the very
high productivity plants are born cleaner and they do not abate; the very low productivity plants
exit due to ine¢ ciency in achieving the emission standard. The average productivity of the dirty
sector could be higher under the standard and therefore the emission standard could be more
e¢ cient. This is di¤erent from the literature that do not consider the productivity dispersion, in
which emission tax is more e¢ cient.
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In the model with productivity dispersion across plants, a uniform emission tax has the fol-
lowing e¤ects: (1) it induces high productivity plants to invest in the new abatement technology;
(2) it leads to a relocation of resources from low productivity plants to high productivity plants;
(3) it drives some low productivity plants out of business; (4) it moves resources from the dirty
sector to the clean sector. The quantied model shows how productivity dispersion inuences the
impacts of pollution policies. The paper nds that a higher degree of productivity dispersion and
therefore the existence of a large mass of low productivity plants increases the costs of curbing air
emissions when the emission-reduction requires those low productivity plants to respond. This
is because those low productivity plants are small in scale and not optimal to choose the more
e¢ cient technology to reduce emissions. Their average abatement costs are high. The aggregate
cost of reducing GHG emissions by 20% from the current level in Canadian industries is about 2
times as large as that in a similar economy without productivity dispersion.
The paper also compares the transition after a pollution policy shock in the models with
and without productivity dispersion. A surprising result is that the economy with productivity
dispersion is much more costly to reduce emissions more aggressively in the early stage. Finally,
in the model with productivity dispersion, to implement the Kyoto Protocol costs 2:16% of real
GDP in a dynamic model. The magnitude of this cost is similar to the one calculated in the
steady state.
The paper evaluates pollution policies in an economy with heterogeneous plants. It calls
attention to the di¤erent reactions of plants to an uniform pollution policy and the resulted
e¢ ciency problem.
43
Appendix: Data Description
1. Dene the clean sector and the dirty sector. There are 16 industries whose abatement
costs per employee are less than 1000$ according to the Environment Canada. The emissions
from these 16 industries account for about 90% of all the industrial emissions. These 16 in-
dustries are dened as dirty industries: Forestry and Logging (NAICS 113000), Oil and Gas
Extraction (NAICS 211000), Mining (NAICS 212000), Electric Power Generation, Transmission
and Distribution (NAICS 221110)Natural Gas Distribution (NAICS 221200), Food manufactur-
ing (NAICS 311000), Beverage and Tobacco Products (NAICS 312000), Wood Products (NAICS
321000), Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills (NAICS 3221000), Petroleum and Coal Products
(NAICS 324000), Chemicals (NAICS 325000), Non-Metallic Mineral Products (NAICS 327000),
Primary Metals (NAICS 331000), Fabricated Metal Products (NAICS 332000), Transportation
Equipment (NAICS 336000), and Pipeline Transportation (NAICS 486000).
2. The investment in new abatement technology during 2000-2002.
Table.I. Adoption of new or signicantly improved systems or equipment to reduce GHG
emissions by industry 11
Introduced new or signicantly Impact on emissions
improved systems or equipment small medium large
Industry percentage
Logging 11 71 29 0
Oil and Gas Extraction 65 31 57 12
Mining 18 70 30 0
Electric Power Generation 29 45 23 32
Natural Gas Distribution 58 0 71 29
Food Manufacturing 10 59 41 0
Beverage and Tobacco Products 16 60 40 0
Wood Products 14 50 36 14
Paper Manufacturing 35 40 36 24
Petroleum and Coal Products 39 62 38 0
Chemicals 18 55 33 13
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 18 46 31 23
Primary Metals 21 30 51 19
Fabricated Metal Products 18 43 50 7
Transportation Equipment 23 59 32 9
Pipeline Transportation 71 17 80 3
Total 24 44 44 13
3. Construct the economy. The emissions from these 16 industries account for about 50% of
the total emissions in Canada. Since this paper focuses on only industrial emissions, the emissions
11This table includes reported data only. Figures may not add up to totals due to rounding.
(1) Adoption of new or signicantly improved systems or equipment within a three year period, 2000-2002.
(2) Respondents who answered Yes to the adoption of new or signicantly improved systems or equipment were
asked to rank the impact on greenhouse gas emission reductions as being small, medium or large.
Source: Statistics Canada, Environment Accounts and Statistics Division.
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from transportation, agriculture, residence, and other sources are excluded. The aggregate GDP
in this paper is therefore cut o¤ about 50% of the total Canadian GDP to match the 50%
emissions. This is done with an assumption that the GDP and emissions are proportional. The
GDP of the clean and dirty goods sectors used in estimating the parameters in the relationship
between GDP ratio and price ratio in equation (3.2) are nominal GDP adjusted by the price
indices constructed below.
4. Construct the relative price. The relative price is the ratio between the price of the dirty ag-
gregate and the price of the clean goods. The dirty goods price is constructed as a GDP-weighted
average of 12 dirty goods: Electric power generation, Petroleum and Coal Products, Fabricated
Metal Products, Food Manufacturing, Beverage and Tobacco Products, Wood Products, Pulp,
Paper, and Paperboard Mills, Primary Metals, Fabricated Metal Products, Gasoline, Chemical
and Chemical Products, and Transportation Equipment. The clean goods price is constructed
as a weighted average of 3 clean goods: new houses, electrical and communication products, and
farm product with wights 54%; 30% and 16%, respectively. The relative price at the initial date,
i.e. 1990, is normalized to 100.
Table II. The price indices for clean goods and dirty goods
Year Price index - clean goods Price index - dirty goods
1990 100 100
1991 94 98
1992 93 99
1993 95 100
1994 97 104
1995 98 112
1996 98 111
1997 97 111
1998 98 104
1999 98 108
2000 99 129
2001 102 130
2002 106 125
2003 108 128
2004 113 150
2005 114 162
2006 122 181
5. The emissions data for Canada from 1990 to 2006 come from the Greenhouse Gas Emissions
National Inventory Report (NIR) by Environment Canada. The GDP data come from Statistics
Canada, CANSIM II. The industrial level emissions and GDP data come from the Canadian
Industrial End-use Energy Data and Analysis Centre and CANSIM II.
6. Total operating and capital expenditures on environmental processes and technologies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by industry, 2004. Source: Statistics Canada, Environment
Accounts and Statistics Division.
45
References
[1] Alvarez, Fernado, and Robert E. Lucas Jr., 2007. "General Equilibrium Analysis of the
Eaton-Kortum Model of International Trade." Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (6), p.
1726-1768.
[2] Antweiler, Werner, Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor, 2001. "Is Free Trade Good For
The Environment?" American Economic Review, 91 (4), p. 877-908.
[3] Bernard, Andrew, Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen, and Sameul Kortum, 2003. "Plants
and Productivity in International Trade." American Economic Review, 93 (4), p. 1268-1290.
[4] Centre for the Study of Living Standards, 2006. "Aggregate Income and Productivity Trends:
Canada versus United States." http://www.csls.ca/data/ipt1.asp
[5] Congressional Research Services, (by Larry Parker), 2004. "Global Climate Change: Con-
trolling CO2 Emissions  Cost-Limiting Safety Valves." The Library of Congress.
[6] Copeland, Brian R. and Taylor, M. Scott, 1994. North-South Trade and the Environment.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3), p. 755787.
[7] Copeland, Brian R. and Taylor, M. Scott, 1995. Trade and Transboundary Pollution.
American Economic Review, 85(4), p. 716737.
[8] Dewees, Donald, 2008. "Pollution and the Price of Power." The Energy Journal, April.
[9] Dixit, A., and J. Stiglitz, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity."
American Economic Review, 67 (3), p. 297-308.
[10] Dunne, Timothy, Mark J. Roberts, and Larry Samuelson, 1989. "The Growth and Failure of
U.S. Manufacturing Plants." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (4), p. 671-698.
[11] Eaton, Jonathan, and Samuel Kortum, 2002. "Technology, Geography, and Trade." Econo-
metrica, 70 (5), p. 1741-1779.
[12] Ghironi, Fabio, and Marc J. Melitz, 2005. "International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynam-
ics with Heterogeneous Firms." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (3), p. 865-915.
[13] Gottinger,H., 1998. "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Computable General Equilibrium."
Journal of Policy Modeling, 20 (5), p. 537-580.
[14] Gray, Wayne B., and Ronald J. Shadbegian, 1995. "Pollution Abatement Costs, Regulation,
and Plant-level Productivity." NBER working paper No. 4994.
[15] Gray, Wayne B., and Ronald J. Shadbegian, 1998. "Environmental Regulation, Investment
Timing, and Technology Choice." The Journal of Industrial Economics, 46 (2) p. 235-256.
[16] Gray, Wayne B., and Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2003. "Plant Vintage, Technology, and Envi-
ronmental Regulation." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46 (3) p.
384-402.
[17] Grossman, G. and A. Krueger, 1995. "Economic Growth and the Environment." Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 110 (2), p. 353-377.
[18] Hazilla, Michael, and Raymond J. Kopp, 1990. "Social Cost of Environmental Quality Reg-
ulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis." The Journal of Political Economy, 98 (4), p.
853-873.
46
[19] Heutel, Garth, 2006. "Plant Vintages, Grandfathering, and Environmental Policy." manu-
script.
[20] Hopenhayn, Hugo A., 1992. "Entry, Exit, and rm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium."
Econometrica. 60 (5), p. 1127-1150.
[21] Jorgenson, D., and P. Wilcoxen, 1990. "Intertemporal General Equilibrium Modeling of U.S.
Environmental Regulation." Journal of Policy Modeling, 12 (4), p. 715-744.
[22] Lopez, Ramon, 1994. The Environment as a Factor of Production: The E¤ects of Economic
Growth and Trade Liberalization.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
27(2), p. 185204.
[23] Melitz, Marc J., 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity." Econometrica, 71 (6), p. 1695-1725.
[24] Nordhaus, D. William, 1993. "Optimal Greenhouse Gas Reductions and Tax Policy in the
"DICE" Model." The American Economic Review, 83 (2), p. 313-317.
[25] Restuccia, Diego, and Richard Rogerson, 2008. "Policy Distortions and Aggregate Produc-
tivity with Heterogeneous Plants." Review of Economic Dynamics, forth coming.
[26] Rotemberg, Julio J., and Michael Woodford, 1992. Oligopolistic Pricing and the E¤ects of
Aggregate Demand on Economic Activity. Journal of Political Economy, 100 (6) p.1153
1207.
[27] Statistics Canada, Environment Accounts and Statistics Division, System of National Ac-
counts, 2004. "Environmental Protection Expenditures in the Business Sector." Catalogue
no.16F0006XIE. Ottawa, www.statcan.ca.
[28] Statistics Canada, Environment Accounts and Statistics Division, System of National Ac-
counts, by Rowena Orok, 2005. "GreenHouse Gas Reduction Technologies: Industry Expen-
ditures and Business Opportunities." Catalogue no. 16-001-MIE  No. 002, Ottawa.
[29] Selden, T. and D. Song, 1994. "Environmental Quality and Development: Is There a Kuznets
Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
27(2), p.147-162.
[30] Shadbegian, Ronald J. and Wayne B. Gray, 2003. "What Determines Environmental Per-
formance at Paper Mills? The Roles of Abatement Spending, Regulation, and E¢ ciency."
Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, 3 (1) p. 1144-1174.
[31] Stokey, N. L., 1998. "Are There Limits to Growth?" International Economic Review, 39 (1),
p. 1-31.
[32] T. Truong, 1999. "GTAP-E: Incorporating Energy Substitution into GTAP Model." GTAP
Technical Paper, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
[33] Zhang, Z. X., 1998. "Macroeconomic E¤ects of CO2 Emission Limits: A Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis for China." Journal of Policy Modeling, 20 (2), p. 213-250.
47
